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India at Doha:  Retrospect and Prospect 
Arvind Panagariya 
Doha is behind us.  But it is also ahead of us.  With the Doha dust settled, however, 
it is a good time to reflect on what has been achieved, how it was achieved, what was India’s 
role, how this role was perceived and why?  It is also a good time to draw lessons from the 
experience since we must get down to the business of developing positions on the 
negotiations to which we have committed ourselves along with other WTO members in 
Doha. 
In Section 1, I begin with an overview of what was achieved in Doha.  I then outline 
India’s negotiating stance in Sections 2 and subject it to critical examination in Section 3.  In 
Section 4, I dissect carefully the origins of the scathing criticisms India received in the 
western press and in Section 5 conclude the paper with lessons for the future. 
1.  What was achieved in Doha? 
The Doha Ministerial Conference produced three key documents: (i) Decision on 
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, which addresses a number of complaints of 
developing countries with respect to the implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) 
Agreement; (ii) Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which weakens 
some of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement; and (iii) Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
which outlines the work program for the new round.
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1 Doha also produced two waivers, a GATT Article XIII waiver for the EC banana regime and a 
GATT Article I waiver for the ACP-EC Partnership (Cotonou) Agreement.  These waivers have no 
direct link to the Ministerial Declaration and could have been handled within the normal WTO 
procedures.  But they had to be moved forward to Doha to get support of the ACP countries for the 
round. A final document on which agreement had been reached in Doha but was not issued until In assessing the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns and the 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, it must be kept in mind that WTO 
Decisions and Declarations do not have the same legal status as the WTO Agreements.  It is 
not entirely clear what weight the WTO Dispute Settlement panels and the Appellate Body 
will give to these documents relative to the WTO Agreements.  More concretely, in a WTO 
dispute, if the provisions in the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
suggest an outcome different from that in the TRIPS Agreement itself, we do not know 
which of the two documents will prevail.  Against this background, let me offer a brief 
description of each of the three documents. 
  (i) Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns 
The Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns had been pushed 
heavily by India with the backing of many developing countries, especially in Asia and 
Africa.  Spanning over eight single-space pages, substantively it offers several relatively 
minor, often inconsequential, concessions to developing countries with respect to the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreements.  I discuss some of the provisions 
of the Declaration in greater detail later in my critique of India’s negotiating stance. 
  (ii) Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
The initiative for the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was 
led by Brazil, India and South Africa and enjoyed wide support among developing 
countries.
2  Setting aside the caveat noted above on its legal standing relative to the TRIPS 
                                                                                                                                                 
November 20, 2001 deals with procedures for extension of Article 27.4 of the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Agreement for certain developing member countries.  This document is 
also without direct bearing on the Ministerial Declaration. 
2 Contrary to the impression conveyed in some news reports in the western media, India did play a 
significant role in pushing the Declaration.  It was one of the eight WTO members—four developing Agreement, the Declaration was a significant victory for developing countries.  The 
Declaration acknowledges the primacy of the member countries’ right to protect public 
health and promote access to medicines for all.  More concretely, it recognizes each 
member’s “right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds 
upon which such licenses are granted.”  It also gives each member the “right to determine 
what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency” for the 
purpose implementing the TRIPS Agreement. 
  (iii) The Doha Ministerial Declaration 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration is a long and complex document and I will not 
discuss the parts that are marginal to the future negotiations.  The main negotiating agenda 
in the Declaration can be divided into four parts: (1) trade liberalization, (2) trade and 
environment, (3) WTO rules and (4) the so-called “Singapore issues” comprising 
investment, competition policy, trade facilitation and transparency in government 
procurement.  Negotiations on the first three items are to constitute a single undertaking and 
concluded by January 1, 2005.  As regards the Singapore issues, negotiations on them may 
not start until after the Fifth Ministerial in 2003 and even then it is not a forgone conclusion.  
This is explained later in greater detail.  
  (1) Trade Liberalization 
  The trade liberalization agenda is wide ranging and includes, industrial goods, 
agricultural goods and services.  The last two of these items have been under negotiation 
                                                                                                                                                 
and four developed—, which drafted the final compromise language of the document.  The eight 
countries in the group were Brazil, India, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Canada, EU, New Zealand, and the  
United States.  South Africa was missing from the list presumably because it has the developed 
country status in WTO though it was with developing countries on this issue. 
 since January 1, 2000 as a part of the UR built-in agenda.  In the area of industrial goods, 
developing countries have complained since the UR Agreement that peak tariffs in 
developed countries are concentrated in labor-intensive goods, textiles and clothing, leather 
and leather products and footwear.  The Ministerial Declaration gives this complaint due 
consideration by agreeing to negotiate reductions in or elimination of tariffs including tariff 
peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation particularly in products of export interest to 
developing countries.  
In the area of agriculture, the members have committed themselves to 
comprehensive negotiations aimed at substantial improvements in market access, reductions 
in, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies and substantial reductions in 
trade-distorting domestic support measures.  European Union (EU) had vehemently opposed 
the insertion of the phrase “with a view to phasing out” and agreed to it only after other 
members agreed to the qualification that the Declaration would not prejudge the outcome of 
negotiations. 
In services, the Declaration recognizes the ongoing negotiations since January 1, 
2000 and refers to the large number of proposals submitted by Members on a wide range of 
sectors and several horizontal issues including the movement of natural persons.  It asks 
participants to submit initial requests for specific commitments by 30 June 2002 and initial 
offers by 31 March 2003. 
(2) Trade and Environment 
  The subject of environment has been under study at the WTO under the auspices of 
the Committee on Trade and Environment for some time.  But the Doha Declaration brings 
it into the negotiating agenda for the first time.   India and most other developing countries had been opposed to bringing environment into the negotiating agenda in any form but EU 
had insisted on it.  Fortunately, the negotiating mandate is quite limited and unlikely to 
damage the interests of developing countries.  It calls for negotiations on (a) the relationship 
between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs); (b) procedures for regular information exchange 
between MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, and the criteria for the 
granting of observer status; and (c) the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
environmental goods and services.  With respect to the first subject, the Declaration 
explicitly notes that the negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that 
is not a party to the MEA in question.  This means that trade sanctions by MEA signatories 
on non-signatories are ruled out. 
  (3) WTO Rules 
  The Declaration opens WTO rules in three areas to negotiation: (1) anti-dumping, 
(2) subsidies and countervailing measures, and (3) regional trade agreements.  The first of 
these was a major concession by the United States to Japan and developing countries.   
Under the second item, members have agreed to open up the issue of fisheries subsides, 
which is an important concession to developing countries.  The third item has been under 
discussion at WTO under the auspices of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements; 
India was one of the countries to have urged its inclusion into the negotiating agenda. 
  (4) Singapore Issues 
EU had insisted on the inclusion of negotiations for multilateral agreements on 
investment, competition policy, trade facilitation and transparency in government 
procurement.  A large number of developing countries, especially from Asia and Africa, had opposed the EU demand.  India was the most vocal opponent and persisted in its demand to 
keep the four issues out of the negotiating agenda until the end.  According to the 
deliberately vague compromise language in the Declaration, members “agree that 
negotiations will take place after the fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis 
of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of 
negotiations.”  Developed countries interpret this phrasing to mean that the Fifth 
Ministerial in 2003 is to decide only on the modalities while the agreement to kick off the 
negotiations is already in place.  Many developing countries take the view that the 
decision on modalities by explicit consensus gives them a veto against the launch of the 
negotiations themselves.  The following clarification, issued by Yussef Hussain Kamal, 
the Chair of the Conference, at the urging of India favors the latter interpretation, though its 
legal standing is tenuous: 
“Let me say that with respect to the reference to an "explicit consensus" 
being needed … for a decision to be taken at the Fifth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference, my understanding is that, at that Session, a decision would indeed need 
to be taken, by explicit consensus, before negotiations on Trade and Investment and 
Trade and Competition Policy, Transparency in Government Procurement, and 
Trade Facilitation could proceed. In my view, this would give each Member the 
right to take a position on modalities that would prevent negotiations from 
proceeding after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference until that Member is 
prepared to join in an explicit consensus."  2.  India’s Negotiating Stance 
  Negotiating positions are difficult to state precisely since they evolve continuously 
until an agreement is reached.  Prior to the Doha meting, India had publicly stated that it did 
not support the launch of a round that went beyond the built-in agenda of the Uruguay 
Round (UR) Agreement.  Yet, in the end, Commerce Minister Murasoli Maran not only 
supported a round that included some new issues but also wisely claimed its launch a victory 
for India.  
  Nevertheless, it can be safely asserted that India joined the talks leading up to the 
Doha Ministerial Conference with a rather extreme position, taking a very hard line.  India’s 
position is most clearly outlined in the press brief entitled “Why India is Opposing 
Negotiations on New Issues,” posted on the Ministry of Commerce website and issued by 
Press Information Bureau, Government of India on November 7, 2001. 
  The title of this brief makes clear India’s unequivocal opposition to the expansion of 
the negotiating agenda beyond the built-in UR agenda, which included market access 
negotiations in agriculture and services and reviews of and negotiations on some narrowly 
specified aspects of a small number of UR Agreements.  But the contents of the press brief 
list more explicitly the areas India opposed going into the Doha meeting: investment, 
competition policy, transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, 
environment, labor and industrial tariffs.  In the case of investment and competition policy, 
the brief expresses India’s opposition to even “plurilateral” agreements within the WTO. 
This position is more or less reiterated in the statement delivered by Maran at Doha 
on behalf of India.  In a key paragraph of the statement, he notes, “Rather than charting a 
divisive course in unknown waters, let this Conference provide a strong impetus to the on-going negotiations on agriculture and services, and the various mandated reviews that by 
themselves form a substantial work programme and have explicit consensus.”  Later, he 
expresses explicit opposition to the inclusion of the so-called Singapore issues into the 
agenda: “In the areas of Investment, Competition, Trade Facilitation or Transparency in 
Government Procurement, basic questions remain even on the need for a multilateral 
agreement.” 
The statement by Maran is not explicit on either support for or opposition to the 
negotiations on market access in industrial goods.  The only paragraph dealing with this 
subject states,  
“In relation to market access, even after all the Uruguay Round concessions have 
been implemented by industrialized countries, significant trade barriers in the form 
of tariff peaks and tariff escalation continue to affect many developing country 
exports.  These will clearly need to be squarely addressed.  Meanwhile, sensitive 
industries in developing countries including small scale industries sustaining a large 
labour force cannot be allowed to be destroyed.”   
Since tariff peaks and tariff escalation could not be addressed outside of new negotiations, 
this statement would seem to suggest support for the inclusion of industrial tariffs into the 
negotiating agenda.  Yet, in the absence of an explicit statement to that effect and the clear 
opposition expressed in the November 7, 2001 brief—“We are not convinced about the need 
for tariff negotiations when even Uruguay Round phase-out has not been yet completed for 
certain products”—, an unambiguous conclusion to this effect cannot be drawn.   
The fact that the draft Ministerial Declaration presented at Doha at the opening of 
the conference does not place the negotiations on industrial tariffs into square brackets, used to signal disagreement on the part of some members, may also suggest that all countries 
including India were on board in this area.  But again, this is not a litmus test: Maran himself 
laments at the beginning of his statement that the draft Ministerial declaration is “negation 
of all that was said by a significant number of developing countries and least-developing 
countries.” 
  Finally, India pushed hard for both implementation issues and the weakening of the 
TRIPS Agreement in the area of public health and medicines.  With regard to the former, 
starting prior to the Seattle Ministerial Conference, India had begun to lobby heavily for an 
agreement.  This push culminated in the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and 
Concerns at Doha.  With respect to the TRIPS Agreement, along with Brazil and South 
Africa, India took the position that the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and 
ensure access to medicines for all.  This effort led to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health. 
Two lesser demands related to intellectual property that Maran also put on the table 
in his Doha statement were the extension of geographical indications to products other than 
wines and spirits and restrictions on the misappropriation of the biological and genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge of the developing countries.  It is not clear whether 
these were serious demands or were intended merely to satisfy certain domestic lobbies. 
3.  Questioning India’s Stance 
Let me begin by noting that Maran’s opposition to the inclusion of the Singapore 
issues into the negotiating agenda is quite defensible.  I have written on this subject in greater detail elsewhere and I will not repeat it here.
3  But let me note two key points.  First, 
if multilateral agreements on investment, competition policy, trade facilitation and 
transparency in government procurement are forged, it is developing countries that will have 
to undertake substantial new obligations.  It is not immediately clear why these countries 
should subject themselves to such obligations without corresponding new obligations by 
developed countries.  More importantly, in as much as many developing countries may not 
be able to fulfill these obligations, they will be exposed to the risk of trade sanctions and 
hence loss of market access in goods and services.  Second, in so far as the investment 
agreement is concerned, the slow pace of liberalization in the area of services, which 
inevitably require opening the market to foreign investment and labor movements, indicates 
that countries find it much harder to open factor markets than goods markets.  
The opposition to WTO agreements on investment, competition policy, trade 
facilitation and transparency in government procurement is not to imply opposition to 
liberalizing policy changes in these areas.  For instance, foreign investment liberalization 
and trade facilitation are not only eminently sensible policies for developing countries but 
also a part of their ongoing policy reforms.  Likewise, transparency is desirable in all aspects 
of the government business including procurement while competition policy at the national 
level exists in many developing countries.  Nevertheless, acceptance of such obligations 
under a WTO agreement before these countries are able to implement them in the form 
required by WTO agreements places their access to markets in goods and services at risk.  
For instance, time bound clearance of goods at the border sought under trade facilitation 
                                                 
3 See my paper “The Millennium Round and Developing Countries: Negotiating Strategies and 
Areas of Benefits,” 2000, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, UNCTAD, Geneva and Center for may be beneficial (though even here the country must decide whether its scarce resources 
should be deployed to speed up the internal movement of goods or at the border)) but 
countries have to be sure that they can implement them before signing on to a WTO 
agreement to this effect.  We have already seen that the TRIPS obligations have been 
sufficiently onerous that the least developed countries have had to be given an extra ten 
years of reprieve under the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.  
But for this extension, many of them would have faced the prospects of trade sanctions. 
  While India’s opposition to the Singapore issues is, thus, defensible, at least three 
aspects of its stance at Doha remain disturbing: (i) failure to lend unequivocal support to 
liberalization in industrial products and, indeed, outright opposition to such liberalization 
where India was concerned; (ii) unduly large dispensation of the negotiating capital on the 
virtually empty box of implementation issues; and (iii) posturing that seemed to convey the 
impression that India was opposed to the launch of the round altogether.  Let me elaborate 
on each of these points in turn. 
  (i) Tariffs on Industrial Products 
Further liberalization in industrial products is in India’s own interest.  Compared to 
virtually every major, economically resilient country, India’s industrial tariffs remain 
astronomically high.  As evidenced by our own experience during 1990s, there is much to 
be gained in terms of productive efficiency and benefits to consumers through further 
liberalization. Politically, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha has publicly stated his 
commitment to bringing the top tariff rate from the current level of 35 percent to 20 percent 
by the year April 2004.  By making such tariff reductions a part of a future WTO round, we 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Development, Harvard university, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  Also available on my only stand to double our benefits by gaining greater access to the U.S. and EU markets as a 
part of an overall bargain. 
Instead, India implicitly took the position that while developed countries must 
eliminate tariff peaks, India should not be asked to liberalize any further.  This meant asking 
developed countries to eliminate tariff peaks unilaterally.  While there is much to be said for 
unilateral liberalization, in practice, large countries have only rarely lowered their tariffs 
unilaterally.  As such the demand by India was unrealistic.  Indeed, tariff peaks in textiles 
and clothing exist today not because developed countries are inherently inclined towards 
discrimination against imports from developing countries.  Instead, they exist because until 
recently, developing countries chose not to participate in multilateral negotiations in any 
meaningful way.  As a result, liberalizing bargains were limited to developed countries and 
hence products that were exported principally by them to one another.
4   
Indeed, when developing countries did finally join the negotiations actively in the 
Uruguay Round, they got the commitment from developed countries to phase out the Multi-
fiber Arrangement (MFA) and thus return this sector to the full discipline of the General 
Agreement on tariffs and Trade (GATT).  There remain complaints that developed countries 
have back loaded the liberalization, pushing much of the substantive liberalization to the last 
two installments due on January 1, 2003 and January 1, 2005.  But fearing that less efficient 
suppliers—India among them—might lose rather than gain market share with the end of the 
quotas, this is precisely what developing countries had bargained.  
                                                                                                                                                 
website: www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/ciepanag.htm. 
4 See Bhagwati, Jagdish and Arvind Panagariya, 2001, “Wanted: Jubilee 2010 Against 
Protectionism” on my website in this context. 
   (ii) Implementation Issues 
India pushed heavily a number of demands under the rubric of “implementation 
issues”.  In my personal judgment, this was a tactical mistake.  To be sure, there are more 
than 50 paragraphs in the Declaration listing large number of items.  But these are lot of 
nothings that do not add up to something.  Substantive concessions in the document are few 
and far between and surely not enough to justify more than two years worth of negotiating 
capital expended to achieve them.  Indeed, somewhat perversely, the Decision allows 
developed countries to convey the impression that having conceded to the demands of 
developing countries without insisting on something in return they have been generous. 
The first point to remember while evaluating the achievements in this area is that as 
noted earlier WTO Decisions do not enjoy quite the same legal status as WTO Agreements.  
In ruling on a dispute, Dispute Settlement panels and the Appellate Body are likely to rely 
principally on the WTO Agreements rather than Decisions. But even leaving that 
consideration aside, the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns is long on 
the expression of good intentions but short on actual commitments. 
As an example, consider what may be the most substantive part of the Decision: the 
provisions relating to the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC).  There are three items in this part of the Decision: (i) developed country 
members should effectively utilize the provisions in the ATC for early elimination of quota 
restrictions; (ii) they should exercise particular consideration before initiating antidumping 
investigations of textile and clothing exports from developing countries previously subject 
to quantitative restrictions under ATC for a period of two years; and (iii) they shall notify any changes in their rules of origin concerning products falling under the coverage of the 
Agreement to the Committee on Rules of Origin which may decide to examine them. 
These provisions add little to what exists in ATC currently.  Provision (i) gives 
developing countries no extra leeway in challenging developed countries on the speed of 
elimination of quota restrictions over and above that granted by ATC.  Precisely how, 
except as already provided in ATC, is one to determine that a country has failed to use the 
provisions relating to the elimination of quotas “effectively”?   Likewise, how is it to be 
determined that a country did not exercise “particular consideration” before initiating 
antidumping investigation?  The provision on the rules of origin is even less of a concession 
than the preceding two. 
The only substantive concession in the area of textiles and clothing sought by 
developing countries as a part of implementation issues was a “growth-on-growth” 
provision amounting to the compounding of the annual growth of quotas.  Currently, textiles 
and clothing quotas are allowed to grow annually at a pre-specified rate with the growth rate 
applied to the initial base in the bilateral quota agreement.  Developing countries had sought 
that growth be built on not just that base but also on growth in the previous years.  This 
concession was not granted in the Decision, however.  Instead, it was referred to the Council 
for Trade in Goods for examination and recommendation by July 31, 2002. 
The view that the Decision carries few substantive benefits for developing countries 
is perhaps not particularly contentious.  Even prior to its finalization in Doha, Abdul Razak 
Dawood, Pakistan’s minister for Commerce, Industries and Production, who was India’s 
ally in pushing for the Decision, noted in the official statement of his government: “The 
package of implementation measures proposed for adoption at Doha is almost a bare cupboard.  Some major countries want to take away what little it contains – such as the 
provision for ‘growth on growth’ in textiles.” 
   (iii) Posturing against the Round 
With less than 1 percent share in the world trade, India would have had almost 
insignificant power to influence the negotiations under normal circumstances.  But two 
factors, both unique to Doha, made India a player of some significance.  First, in the wake of 
the September 11 events, Bush administration had assigned the launch of a new round the 
highest priority.  In retrospect, it is fair to speculate that Robert Zoellick, the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR), arrived in Doha with the intention not to return home empty 
handed.  This fact gave each country, including India, some leverage.  This was confirmed 
by the fact that the United States gave special concessions to virtually all members he 
possibly could. 
Second, repeated assertions by both the United States and EU that the next round 
must be a development round left them boxed in their own rhetoric: they would not look 
good launching a development round without the endorsement of a poor country with one 
billion people.  A development round that left out one fifth of the humanity would be a joke.  
Bringing India on board was essential. 
Given these facts and India’s stance prior to arrival the at Doha, there was some 
measure of discomfort on the part of some developed countries in Doha that India might 
become the ultimate stumbling block to the launch of the new round.  Therefore, India 
already ran the risk that as a pressure tactic, developed countries would try to discredit it as 
obstructionist.  By failing to take a clear public stance in favor of a round that will squarely 
focus on trade liberalization in all sectors and conveying it forcefully to the press and returning repeatedly to the theme of restricting the negotiations to the UR built-in agenda 
and implementation issues, India made itself highly vulnerable to the charge of 
obstructionism.   
Lest this diagnosis should appear an afterthought, let me remind that many, 
including the author, had advocated the strategy of supporting aggressively a trade 
liberalization round well before the Doha meeting.  I cannot resist reproducing some key 
passages from my monthly column in the Economic Times dated August 25, 2001: 
“Two years ago, prior to the WTO ministerial in Seattle, I had argued that 
developing countries should support a minimalist negotiating agenda that includes the UR 
built-in agenda plus trade liberalization in industrial goods.  The built-in agenda requires 
negotiations in agriculture and services and reviews of certain aspects of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding and Agreement on TRIPs.  This agenda still makes sense for 
India. 
“As a part of its economic reforms, India is likely to continue liberalizing its trade in 
industrial goods, agriculture and services.  The benefit from this liberalization can be greatly 
leveraged by pursuing it in the context of a multilateral negotiation.  This way, we will 
benefit not only from our own liberalization but from the liberalization of our trading 
partners as well.  The dividend on the latter is double nowadays since it helps dilute trade 
preferences which have proliferated lately and discriminate against our exports in North 
America, Europe and other parts of the world.” 
I went on to conclude thus: “It is also important to recognize that most developing countries do not want a round 
that includes labor standards in any form whatsoever.  Prospects for a round consistent with 
this goal have never been better.  As a part of the mandate for the next round, developing 
countries may be able to assign this subject to the International Labor Organization once and 
for all.  
“This leaves principally the subjects of investment, competition policy and 
environment and trade on which the European Union is insistent.  Even here, compromise 
may be possible.  One option is to place these latter subjects on a second track and make 
participation in negotiations on issues on the second track optional.  Alternatively, 
sufficiently tight wording could be chosen to limit the scope of negotiations in these areas.” 
“The key element of our strategy must be to identify attainable objectives that best 
serve our interests.  The negotiating strategy should be then targeted to achieve these 
objectives.” 
4.  Questioning the Coverage in the Western Press 
During and immediately after the Doha meeting, India was subject to scathing 
criticism by the western news media.  The Financial Times (November 15) called the 
country the “worst villain” and “the only real loser,” the Economist (November 17, 2001) 
chastised it for having “almost scuttled” the launch of the round and the Wall Street Journal 
(November 16, 2001) described Maran as “the man who rattled the WTO in Doha.”  How 
do we explain this hostile treatment? 
To be sure, India bears part of the responsibility.  By giving the distinct impression 
publicly that it was against negotiations beyond the UR built-in agenda, even if this may not have been its actual negotiating position behind the scenes, India made itself vulnerable to 
these criticisms.  But this is only half the story.  Let me explain why. 
While Maran was surely the most vocal opponent of the Singapore issues, he was 
scarcely alone.  The United States itself did not want the expansionist agenda but acquiesced 
to EU demand as a price of launching the round.  More importantly, Egypt, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Nigeria, Kenya and a host of other countries from Africa and 
Asia had expressed unequivocal opposition to the inclusion of these issues in the negotiating 
agenda.  The main difference between these countries and India was that having been 
promised their respective favorite concessions, they were willing to go along with the 
compromise worked out by the United States and EU on the Singapore issues, while India 
chose to stick to its original position.   
In view of the fact that five years earlier India had accepted Singapore issues as 
study topics in the Singapore Declaration on the condition that negotiations on them will be 
launched by “explicit consensus,” Maran cannot be faulted for demanding the continuation 
of this provision in the Doha Declaration.  After all, EU had also insisted on the language on 
the phase out of export subsidies until end and, indeed, delayed the Doha Conference by 
almost a full day.  Likewise, a day earlier, ACP countries, which had been demanding an 
Article I waiver for their preferential Cotonou trade arrangement with EU, had threatened to 
walk out of the negotiations if the waiver was not granted to them.  In this last case, 
technically the issue was not even formally linked to the Ministerial package.  Maran’s 
misfortune was that the issue that concerned him most lingered till the end.  That made him 
the last signatory to the Doha Declaration, leaving the distinct impression that he, and not 
Pascal Lamy of EU, was therefore to be blamed for the delay.   There is one further disadvantage India faced in Doha in so far as its public image 
was concerned.  At least technically speaking, the WTO secretariat is supposed to act as a 
neutral facilitator, a clearinghouse of sorts, for the negotiations.  Nevertheless, the success of 
its Director General is ultimately measured by his ability to advance the negotiations.   
Therefore, Mike Moore, who was attending his last Ministerial meeting as Director General, 
had a heavy stake in the launch of the round.  This fact made the WTO Secretariat 
potentially unsympathetic to a member viewed as a threat to the launch of the round. 
  Additionally, bureaucracies are inherently expansionist.  Like the TRIPS 
Agreement, the Singapore issues offer a large scope for the expansion of the policy space 
over which WTO can have its sway.  This makes the WTO bureaucracy naturally inclined 
toward the inclusion of the Singapore issues into the negotiating agenda.  This natural 
inclination is complemented by the location of WTO in Geneva.  The staff can scarcely 
escape what they observe in their backyards: EU’s fervor for the expansionist agenda. 
  These factors made India potentially a target of criticism by WTO staff in their 
informal contacts with the press.  Lest this might appear entirely speculative, let me offer a 
concrete example.  Following the attacks on India in the Financial Times, Per Gahrton, 
Member of the European Parliament (Greens, Sweden) wrote in a letter to the newspaper 
(November 24, 2001): 
“Sir, in your editorial on the World Trade Organization meeting in Doha (November 
15), you named India as the "villain" of the meeting. 
“Having followed the deliberations as a member of the European parliament 
delegation I would rather consider Mr. Maran, head of the Indian delegation, as a defeated hero of a common Third World cause. I would propose another candidate for the pejorative 
label: Pascal Lamy, trade commissioner of the European Union. 
“On the morning of the last official day of negotiations Mr. Lamy admitted to MEPs 
that the EU ‘is the problem’, being at loggerheads with others on several crucial points, 
including its defense for the protectionist interests of certain member countries, such as 
agriculture, fisheries and textiles.” 
Astonishingly, four days later, Mike Moore came to the defense of Pascal Lamy.  In 
a letter published on November 28, 2001 in the Financial Times and reproduced below in its 
entirety, Moore wrote: 
“Sir, It has not been my practice to involve myself in domestic political differences 
but the sheer magnitude of the injustice in the letter of November 24 from Per Gahrton, an 
MEP at the Doha ministerial, attacking Pascal Lamy, the European Union trade 
commissioner, has moved me to comment. 
“It was Mr. Lamy who led the battle for market access for least developed countries 
(Everything But Arms). Commissioner Lamy's role in brokering the waiver for African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries on preferential access to the EU market was widely 
acclaimed and the first ministers speaking in favor of the deal were from Africa. It was Mr 
Lamy who fought for and won advances on trade and the environment, public access to 
medicines and the trade-related intellectual property rights agreement. He fought but was 
less successful on labour issues. He has led on matters of internal governance and 
transparency and the involvement of the World Trade Organization and civil society. 
“Europe had other agenda items that it promoted one way or another. Mr. Gahrton 
must have been at a different ministerial from the rest of us.” In defending Lamy, Mike Moore seemed to also defend his agenda extending to 
environment and labor, something that has been inimical to the position of virtually all 
developing countries.  Additionally, by neither coming to Maran’s defense following the 
original attacks on him in the Financial Times nor stating a single kind word for him while 
aggressively defending Lamy, he also conveyed a clear preference for the latter’s position 
over Maran’s.  This is a far cry from what WTO is supposed to do: be an honest broker and 
clearinghouse for its member countries. 
5.  Concluding Remarks: The Way Forward 
Continued asymmetries between the influence of the rich and poor countries 
notwithstanding, WTO is by far our best hope for protecting our trading rights.  It is not a 
“necessary evil” as our leaders sometimes describe it; instead, it is god sent.  A key 
condition for faster economic growth in countries such as India is guaranteed access to open 
world markets.  And the only institution that can deliver this access is WTO.  In spite of the 
pressures we face from the rich countries through WTO as reflected, for example, in the 
demand for trade-labor link, WTO remains the best guarantor of our trading rights.  Anyone 
who thinks otherwise only need contemplate a world without WTO.  In that world, rich 
countries would not need to demand the trade-labor link; they will simply impose it.  It is the 
power of the WTO rules that protects smaller nations from unilateral trade sanctions by rich 
and powerful nations. 
In developing our future negotiating positions, we need to think far more 
systematically than we seem to have done to-date.  At least three strategic conclusions can 
be drawn from the UR and Doha experiences.  First, we need to consider direct benefits to 
us of any demands we put forward in the negotiations.  Any time we demand something, we are using up our negotiating capital and we must be sure that there is a commensurate 
benefit in store for us.  As an example, consider our demand for growth-on-growth of MFA 
quotas.  Did we analyze if this would generate benefits for us?  From the information I have 
been able to collect, during the last two years, most of our MFA quotas have remained 
underutilized, presumably because of our high costs of production.  Therefore, prima facie it 
is questionable whether we would have been able to export more had developed countries 
conceded the growth-on-growth demand.  On the contrary, increased exports by other 
countries under faster quota expansion would have even lowered the prices, making us 
relatively less competitive.  Did we even consider such calculations? 
In the same vein, we have made demands for the extension of protection to 
geographical indications for products other than wines and spirits and for rules against 
misappropriation of the traditional knowledge and genetic resources?  How do these 
demands square with our complaints against the very inclusion of intellectual property rights 
into the WTO?  Have we done the cost-benefit analysis of expanding intellectual property 
protection in these areas?  
Second, diplomacy requires that we define our negotiating position positively rather 
than negatively.  Our approach should be to state clearly the agenda on which we are willing 
to support a round.  Only after we have clearly stated our affirmative position should be 
proceed to the negative, with clear reasons for our objections.  Without precluding an 
inflexible position on certain issues such as trade-labor link, it also does not make sense for 
us to lock ourselves publicly into a very inflexible overall position prior to the round.   
Countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt had taken positions quite similar to ours in their official statements but avoided giving the impressions of inflexibility 
in their public statements.  
Finally and most importantly, prior to defining the negotiating position, we must 
think hard about the end game.  For example, before we took the hard-line position in Doha, 
we should have asked ourselves: are we willing to walk out of the negotiations even if we 
are the only country to do so and if yes at what point?  Is trade-labor link the make or break 
issue?  Or is it the environment?  Or Singapore issues?  Or trade liberalization in industrial 
goods? We should have defined our negotiating position based on the answers to these 
questions.  By repeatedly staking a position that is far from what we eventually accept as has 
been the case in the UR Agreement and the Doha Declaration, we lose credibility in the 
future negotiations and risk being isolated. 
This risk has now increased manifold with the entry of China into WTO.  As the 
largest developing country in terms of population, India enjoyed some advantage in the past 
negotiations.  Now it will have to share this advantage with China.  For instance, if China 
decides to take an essentially pro-negotiations stance towards the Singapore issues, it is 
unlikely that India will be able to stop negotiations on them from proceeding despite the 
“explicit consensus” provision in the Doha Declaration.  Are we willing to walk out of 
negotiations then even if we are the only country to do so?  Our negotiators must think 
through that question before they arrive in Mexico in 2003 for the Fifth WTO Ministerial.  
(The author wishes to thank Jagdish Bhagwati for numerous helpful discussions and 
comments on an earlier draft.) 